Mechanism design by observant and informed planners by Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen
 

























Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi  
Planning Unit 
7 S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110 016, India 






∗Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, Mexico D.F. 10700, Mexico.
†Indian Statistical Institute, 7 SJS Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India.
11 Introduction
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is a fundamental result in the theory of mech-
anism design. It states that if a planner has to provide dominant strategy incen-
tives for agents to reveal their private information, then this can accomplished
only by allowing some agent (called the dictator) to always get his most preferred
alternative. An assumption which is crucial for the result, is that the domain
of preference ordering is complete. An extensive literature on restricted domains
has emerged whose objective is to escape the strongly negative conclusion of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem by assuming that the domain of admissible pref-
erences is restricted. For instance, if preferences are assumed to be single-peaked,
then the median voter rule provides appropriate incentives for all agents to be
truthful. If money is introduced in the model and preferences are assumed to be
quasi-linear, then the rich theory of Groves-Clarke transfers applies and numerous
possibility results exist. Other examples of restricted domains include economic
environments where agents’ preferences are assumed to be continuous and convex
and environments where the objective function of the planner is stochastic and
agents’ preferences satisfy von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
In this paper, we focus attention on a model which is related by quite diﬀerent in
spirit to therestricted domain model. We refer to this model as one with a partially
observant planner. The idea is that ex-ante, an agent can have any preference
ordering. However, after realization, the planner is able to observe some feature
of these preferences. For instance, in a model of committee voting, the planner
may be able to observe that voter 1’s most preferred candidate is x, voter 2’s least
preferred candidate is y, voter 3 prefers w to z and so on. Thus, the planner
has some (ex-post) information on preferences which could be based on commonly
known ideological positions, personal dislikes etc. The mechanism, however, in
keeping with the standard assumption has to designed ex-ante, i.e. before the
2realization of preferences. On the other hand, in the restricted domains model,
which we refer to as the partially informed planner model, the planner has some
ex-ante information on the structure of preferences. We believe that the observant
planner model is a realistic one and worthy of attention. It is particularly plausible
in the standard voting model where it may be unnatural to impose structure such
as single-peakedness, convexity or cardinal-valuedness.
The observant planner model is also related to the complete information imple-
mentation model. In the latter, agents know each others preferences perfectly but
the planner is completely ignorant. The problem here is to design a mechanism
which will allow the planner to collate reports from each agent to infer something
about the true state of the world. In the observant planner model, partial infor-
mation about each voters’ preference is not only common knowledge amongst the
other voters but is also known to the planner.
The analysis in the observant planner model diﬀers in crucial respects from
that in the informed planner model. In the former, the domain of preferences re-
mains complete unlike that in the informed planner model. However, the incentive
compatibility condition is weaker. In particular we require only that no voter can
gain by misrepresenting his preferences only for thos misrepresentations which are
consistent with observed information. Suppose that the planner knows that voter
i’s peak is x. Then it must the case that the agent cannot do better than truth-
telling than by announcing any other preference whose peak is x. The analysis, in
the two models is thus independent of each other.
In the paper, we assume that the observant planner can observe the peak of each
voters’ preference ordering. We provide a complete characterization of incentive
compatible social choice functions under a range assumption. We contrast this
case with that of a restricted domain model where the planner has some ex-ante
information about peaks. In particular, it is known that each voter’s peak lies in
some pre-speciﬁed set which is a subset of the set of alternatives.
3Our results are as follows. In the observant planner case we show that if a range
condition is satisﬁed, a social choice condition is incentive compatible if and only
if, for every vector peaks, there is a voter and a set of alternatives over which this
voter is a dictator. The choice of the voter who dictates and the set over which
he does so could depend on what the planner observes. In the informed planner
model on the other hand, incentive compatibility (or strategy-proofness) implies
that there is a dictator over the range of the social choice function. There are
therefore signiﬁcant possibility results in the observant planner case unlike in the
informed planner case. We also demonstrate that the dictatorship result in the
informed planner is rather delicate and depends critcally on our assumption that
the planner only has a priori information on voter peaks. We show by means of an
example that if the planner had information on the alternatives which were ranked
ﬁrst and second, then non-dictatorial possibility results exist.
Although our results are quite intuitive they are not very easy to prove. There
does appear to be a way to apply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem directly. A
special feature of these models is that the “eﬀective” domain of preferences are
voter speciﬁc. The induction technique of coalescing or cloning voters used in
various proofs (for example, Sen (2001)) can no longer be used. We develop a
completely novel induction technique which can be used to provide yet another
proof of the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic notation while
the next two sections discuss the observant and informed planner models. The last
section concludes.
2 Basic Notation
The set I = {1,···,N} is the set of individuals or voters. The set of alternatives
is the set A with |A| = m. Elements of A will be denoted by a,b,c,d etc. Let
4I P denote the set of strict orderings1 of the elements of A. A typical preference
ordering will be denoted by Pi where aPib will signify that a is preferred (strictly) to
b under Pi. A preference proﬁle is an element of the set I P N. Preference proﬁles will
be denoted by P, ¯ P,P 0 etc and their i-th components as Pi, ¯ Pi,P 0
i respectively with
i = 1,···,N. Let ( ¯ Pi,P−i) denote the preference proﬁle where the i-th component
of the proﬁle P is replaced by ¯ Pi.
For all Pi ∈ I P and k = 1,···,m, let rk(Pi) denote the k th ranked alternative
in Pi, i.e., rk(Pi) = a implies that |{b 6= a|bPia}| = k−1. For all Pi, the alternative
r1(Pi) will be referred to as the peak of Pi.
For all Pi ∈ I P and B ⊂ A, max (Pi,B) will denote the maximal element in B
according to Pi.
3 The Partially Observant Planner
We assume that each individual i’s preferences Pi are drawn from the set I P. The
objectives of the planner are described by a social choice function deﬁned below.
Definition 3.1 A Social Choice Function (SCF) f is a mapping f : I P N → A.
The preference ordering of voter i is i’s private information. However, once it
has been realized, each voter’s peak r1(Pi) can be observed by the planner. Since
the vaule of a SCF f at a preference proﬁle could depend on more than voters’
peaks at that proﬁle, preferences have to be elicited from voters. The appropriate
incentive constraints to ensure truth telling in this setting are described below.
Definition 3.2 A SCF f is strategy-proof* (SP*) if, for all i ∈ I, Pi ∈ I P,
P−i ∈ I P N−1, there does not exist P 0
i ∈ I P, such that
• r1(Pi) = r1(P 0
i) and
1A strict ordering is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation
5• f(P 0
i,P−i)Pif(Pi,P−i)
Thus, incentive compatibility requires that no can individual proﬁt from devi-
ating from truth telling when these deviations are consistent with the information
held by the planner. Observe that SP* diﬀers from the standard notion of strategy-
proofness only in this respect. (The latter condition does not require that the P 0
i
in the deﬁnition above satisﬁes the condition r1(Pi) = r1(P 0
i)). Of course, a SCF
which is strategy-proof also satisﬁes SP*.
Our goal is to characterize the SCFs which satisfy SP*. We ﬁrst note a familiar
deﬁnition.
Definition 3.3 A SCF f is dictatorial in the range of f, denoted by Rf, if there
exists an individual i such that for all proﬁles P ∈ I P N, we have f(P) = max
(Pi,Rf).
Dictatorial SCFs play a central role in the theory of strategy-proof SCFs. A
dictatorial SCF is strategy-proof SCF. Moreover, according to the well-known
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, a strategy-proof SCF which has a range of at
least three alternatives, is dictatorial. The example below shows that this is no
longer true under SP*.
Example 3.1
For each a ∈ A, let Ba ⊂ A. Deﬁne a SCF f as follows.
For all P ∈ I P N, f(P) = max (P2,Br1(P1))
Thus voter 1 ”oﬀers” a set of outcomes for voter 2 to choose from. This set
depends on voter 1’s observable peak. Note that this SCF is SP*. It is also non-
dictatorial. In fact, by choosing the set Ba to be either a singleton or the whole
set A, the domain of preference proﬁles I P N can be partitioned arbitrarily into two
sets, one over which voter 1 gets his maximum and the other over which 2 gets his
maximum.
6The set of all SP* SCFs can be obtained by suitably generalizing the example
above.
Let f be a SCF. Let a1,a2,···,aN ∈ A. The set Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) is deﬁned
as follows.
Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) = {f(P)|r1(Pi) = ai,i = 1,2,···,N}.
Thus Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) is the range of f when the peak of Pi is constrained to
be ai for i = 1,2,···,N.
For all P ∈ I P N, we will let r1(P) denote the vector (r1(P1),r1(P2),···,r1(PN)).
We are ready for the characterization result.
Theorem 3.1 Let f be a SCF. Assume that for all a1,a2,···,aN ∈ A,
|Rf(a1,a2,···,aN)| ≥ 3. Then f is SP* if and only if there exist maps φ1 : AN →
N and φ2 : AN → 2A 2 such that
for all P ∈ I P N, f(P) = max (Pφ1(r1(P)),φ2(r1(P))
Proof: Suﬃciency
This follows easily from the observation that at no proﬁle P, can a voter can
change the identity of the individual φ1(r1(P)) nor the set φ2(r1(P)) by changing
his preference announcement. Of course, player φ1(r1(P)) gets his best alternative
in the feasible set by telling the truth and can only be worse-oﬀ by misrepresenting
his preferences.
Necessity
We will prove the result by induction on N.
2We let 2A denote the set of all non-empty subsets of A
7Consider the case where there is only one voter say voter 1. Let f be a SCF
satisfying SP*. The function φ1 is the constant function whose value is 1. For
all a1 ∈ A, let φ2(a1) = Rf(a1). An immediate consequence of SP* is that for
all P1 ∈ I P, f(P1) = max (P1,Rf(r1(P1)). This establishes the result in the case
where N = 1.
We now complete the induction step. Pick an integer N > 1 and assume that
the result is valid for all integers K < N. Let f : I P N → A be a SCF satisfying
SP* and such that for all a1,a2,···,aN ∈ A, |Rf(a1,a2,···,aN)| ≥ 3.
For all ai ∈ A, let I P ai denote the set of all orderings whose peak is ai. For
all a1,···,aN ∈ A, let D(a1,···,aN) denote the Cartesian product of the sets I P ai
with i = 1,···,N. Let g : D(a1,···,aN) → A be the restriction of f to the set
D(a1,···,aN), i.e. for all P ∈ D(a1,···,aN), g(P) = f(P). Clearly g satisﬁes SP*.
We will show that g is dictatorial over the range of g which we will denote simply
as Rg. This will enough to prove the theorem because of the following observations
(i) the sets D(a1,···,aN) obtained as a1,···,aN vary, form a partition of the set
of proﬁles I P N (ii) we can let the values of φ1(a1,···,aN) and φ2(a1,···,aN) be the
the identity of the dictator and the range respectively, of the appropriate function
g.
Let i ∈ I and Pi ∈ I P ai. Let
Rg(Pi) = {x|x = g(Pi,P−i) for some P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN)} 3
Thus Rg(Pi) is the range of g when voter i’s preference is ﬁxed at Pi. Our
objective is to show that there exists some i and Pi such that |Rg(Pi)| ≥ 3. For
future reference we let B denote the (unrestricted) range of g. (By assumption
|B| ≥ 3.
3The set D−i(a1,···,aN) is deﬁned in the obvious way: for all Pi ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN), we have
(Pi,P−i) ∈ D(a1,···,aN).
8Lemma 3.1 Let x ∈ B and Pi ∈ I P ai be such that x = max(Pi,B). Let
P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) be such that for all j 6= i, we have x = r2(Pi) whenever
x 6= aj. Then g(Pi,P−i) = x.
Proof: Since x ∈ B, there exists ¯ P ∈ D(a1,···,aN) such that g( ¯ P) = x. Now
pick a voter j 6= i and switch his preference ordering from ¯ Pj to Pj. Suppose
g(Pj, ¯ P−j) = w. If xPjw, then j will gain by announcing ¯ Pj instead of his true
preference Pj at proﬁle (Pj, ¯ P−j). If wPjx, then w = aj and w ¯ Pjx. Then j will
be better oﬀ by announcing Pj instead of announcing his true preference ¯ Pj at
proﬁle ¯ P. Therefore w = x. Repeating this argument for all j 6= i, we obtain
g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x. Suppose g(Pi,P−i) = w. If w 6= x, then xPiw because x = max
(Pi,B). But then i will gain by announcing ¯ Pi rather than his true preference Pi
at the proﬁle (Pi,P−i). Therefore g(Pi,P−i) = x.
According to Lemma 3.1, the maximal element in B according to Pi is the
outcome under g of the proﬁle where all other voters rank this element as ”high as
possible”. We also record a trivial corollary of the Lemma.
Corollary An immediate consequence of Lemma 3.1 is that if x = max
(Pi,B), then x = Rg(Pi).
Lemma 3.2 Let Pi, ¯ Pi ∈ I P ai be such that max(Pi,B) = max( ¯ Pi,B). Then
Rg(Pi) = Rg( ¯ Pi).
Proof: Suppose not. Let max(Pi,B) = max( ¯ Pi,B) = x. In view of Lemma
3.2, there must exist y 6= x such that y ∈ Rg(Pi) but y / ∈ Rg( ¯ Pi). Construct
P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) as follows. For all j 6= i
9• if x = aj, then r2(Pj) = y
• if y = aj, then r2(Pi) = x
• if x and y are both distinct from aj, then r2(Pj) = y and r3(Pj) = x.
In other words, under Pj, y is better than x whenever possible. In addition,
they are also both ranked as ”high as possible”.
We ﬁrst claim that g(Pi,P−i) = y. In order to see this, note that since y ∈
Rg(Pi), there exists P 0
−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) such that g(Pi,P 0
−i) = y. Now pick a
arbitrary voter j 6= i and let g(Pi,Pj,P 0
i,j) = w. Oberve that if yPjw, then j would
gain by announcing P 0
j instead of his true preference Pj at the proﬁle (Pi,Pj,P 0
i,j).
On the other hand, if wPjy, then w = aj and once again SP* would be violated
because j would gain by announcing Pj instead of P 0
j at (Pi,P 0
i). Therefore w = y
and applying this argument repeatedly, we claim that g(Pi,P−i) = y.
We claim next that g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x. To see this consider all voters j 6= i and
let ¯ Pj ∈ I P aj be the ordering obtained by just reversing the ranking of x and y
whenever possible leaving preferences over all other alternatives undisturbed. If
either x or y coincide with aj, ¯ Pj = Pj. It follows from Lemma 3.1 that g( ¯ P) = x
(since all voters other than i rank x as high as possible). Now change voter j’s
ordering from ¯ Pj to Pj. The new outcome can only be either x or y. But it cannot
be y because y / ∈ Rg( ¯ Pi). Proceeding to the end of the sequence and repeating the
same argument, we obtain g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x.
But this will violate SP* because voter i whose true preference is Pi will be
strictly better oﬀ by announcing ¯ Pi in the proﬁle ( ¯ Pi,P−i).
Lemma 3.3 Either |Rg(Pi)| = 1 or |Rg(Pi)| ≥ 3.
10Proof: Suppose not. Suppose there exists x,y,z ∈ B with x,y ∈ Rg(Pi) and
z / ∈ Rg(Pi). In view of the Corollary, we can assume without loss of generality
that x = max(Pi,B). Also applying Lemma 3.2, we can assume that r2(Pi) = x,
r3(Pi) = z and r4(Pi) = y if x 6= ai and r2(Pi) = z and r2(Pi) = y if x = ai. Now
choose P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) such that for all j 6= i,
• if aj = y, then r2(Pj) = z
• if aj = z, then r2(Pj) = y
• if aj 6= y,z, then r2(Pj) = z and r3(Pj) = y.
We claim that g(Pi,P−i) = y. We use an argument identical to one we em-
ployed in the previous Lemma. Let ¯ P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) be obtained by reversing
wherever possible, the alternatives y and z in the preferences of all voters j 6= i in
P−i. Since y ∈ Rg(Pi) and y is ranked as ”high as possible”, it follows (by using
an argument in Lemma 3.2) that g(Pi, ¯ Pi) = y. Now progressively switch the pref-
erences of all voters j 6= i from ¯ Pj to Pj. All along this sequence, the outcome is
either y or z because they are the only two alternatives over which preferences are
changing. But the outcome can never be z anywhere along the sequence because
z / ∈ Rg(Pi). Therefore g(Pi,P−i) = y.
Let P 0
i ∈ I P ai be obtained by switching, (if possible), y and z in the ordering
Pi. Notice that at the proﬁle (P 0,P−i), z is ranked as ”high as possible” in the
ranking in all the voters’preferences. Since z ∈ B, it follows from the argument
used in Lemma 3.1 and elsewhere that g(P 0
i,P−i) = z. But then SP* is violated
because zPiy and g(Pi,P−i) = y. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 3.5 It cannot be the case that for all i ∈ I and Pi ∈ I P ai, we have
|Rg(Pi)| = 1.
11Proof: Suppose not. Pick Pi ∈ I P ai and let Rg(Pi) = x. For all j 6= i, pick
¯ Pj ∈ I P aj such that x is ranked ”as low as possible” i.e. if x = aj, then r1( ¯ Pj) = x;
otherwise x is ranked last in ¯ Pj. It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the
set Rg(Pi) that g(Pi, ¯ P−i) = x. Let ¯ Pi ∈ I P ai be such that x is ranked ”as low
as possible”. Now pick some j 6= i. Since |Rg( ¯ Pj| = 1 by hypothesis and since
g(Pi, ¯ P−i) = x, it follows that g( ¯ P) = x. Let ˜ P ∈ D(a1,···,aN) be an arbitrary
proﬁle. By changing voter preferences progressively from the ¯ P proﬁle to the ˜ P
proﬁle and applying SP* repeatedly, we can conclude that g( ˜ P) = x. But this
implies that B = {x} which contradicts our assumption that |B| ≥ 3.
We know from Lemma 3.5 that there exists i ∈ I and Pi ∈ I P ai such that
|Rg(Pi)| ≥ 3. Let h : D−i(a1,···,aN) → A be deﬁned as follows. For all P−i ∈
D−i(a1,···,aN)
h(P−i) = g(Pi,P−i)
Clearly h is a SCF deﬁned over a society of N − 1 voters. It is trivial to check
that h satisﬁes SP*. Moreover, since the range of h is Rg(Pi), it has at least three
elements. We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis to conclude that that
there exists a voter, say j where j ∈ I−{i} such that for all P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN),
we have
g(Pi,P−i) = h(P−i) = max(Pj,Rg(Pi))
Here φ2(a1,..,ai−1,ai+1,..,aN) = range h = Rg(Pi).
We complete the proof by showing that j is also the dictator in g.
In order to do this let ¯ Pi ∈ I P ai be such that it involves a switch of two
alternatives which were ranked consecutively in Pi. In other words, there exists x
and y such that rk(Pi) = x and rk+1(Pi) = y for some integer k and rk( ¯ Pi) = y and
rk+1( ¯ Pi) = x. The ranking of all alternatives other than x and y are unchanged
12in ¯ Pi relative to Pi. Suppose that there exists P 0
−i ∈ Di(a1,···,aN) such that
g(Pi,P 0
−i) 6= g( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i). In order for SP* not to be violated it must be the case
that g(Pi,P−i) = x and g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = y. Since j dictates in h, it follows that x =
max(Pj,Rg(Pi)). Furthermore, x is not the peak of Pj; otherwise Rg(Pi) = {x}
which contradicts our hypothesis that |Rg(Pi)| ≥ 3. In view of Lemma 3.4, there
are two cases to consider.
Case A |Rg( ¯ Pi)| ≥ 3.
It follows from the induction hypothesis that there exists a voter k 6= i such
that for all P−i ∈ Di(a1,···,aN), we have
g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = max (Pk,Rg( ¯ Pi))
It is clear that k must be distinct from j; otherwise g(Pi,P 0
−i) = g( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i) = x
which violates our hypothesis. Assume therefore that k and j are distinct. Now
pick ¯ P−i ∈ Di(a1,···,aN), such that r2( ¯ Pj) = y and r2( ¯ Pk) = x. (Note that the
peaks of Pj and Pk cannot lie in the sets Rg(Pi) and Rg( ¯ Pi) respectively. If they
did then the cardinality of these sets be one instead of at least three as we have
assumed.) Then g(Pi, ¯ P−i) = y and g( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i) = x and SP* would be violated since
xPiy by assumption.
Case B |Rg( ¯ Pi)| = 1.
An immediate consequence of this assumption is that g( ¯ Pi,P−i) = y for all
P−i ∈ Di(a1,···,aN).
Since |Rg(Pi)| ≥ 3, there must exist z ∈ Rg(Pi) distinct from both x and y.
Since x and y are contiguous in Pi, z must be either worse than both x and y or
better than both x and y according to Pi.
Suppose that the former is true. Pick ¯ P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN) such that r2( ¯ Pj) =
z. It follows that g(Pi, ¯ P−i) = z. On the other hand g( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i) = y. Since
g( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i) = y and yPiz, it follows that SP* will be violated. Now suppose instead
that z is better than both x and y according to Pi. This impies that z ¯ Piy. Picking
13¯ P−i as before, we observe that voter i will be better oﬀ announcing Pi instead of
his true preference ¯ Pi at the proﬁle ( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i).
We have established that g(Pi,P−i) = g( ¯ Pi,P−i) for all P−i ∈ D−i(a1,···,aN).
By considering a sequence of switches of contiguous alternatives, we can demon-
strate the same equality for all ¯ Pi ∈ I P ai. But g(Pi,P−i) = max(Pj,Rg(Pi)).
Therefore, the set Rg(Pi) does not depend on Pi. Writing it as Rg, we have
g(P) = max(Pj,Rg) for all P ∈ D(a1,···,aN)
Thus voter j dictates in g over the range Rg which proves the result.
Remark 3.1 Example 3.1 is a special case of the characterization in Theorem
3.1 where N = 2, φ1(a1,a2) = 2 and φ2(a1,a2) = Ba1 for all (a1,a2).
Remark 3.2 The proof of Theorem 3.1 has a special feature. The usual induc-
tion proofs of such propositions, such as the proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem in Sen (2001) employ the technique of coalescing or cloning voters in the
induction step. This is done in order to deﬁne a SCF on a society of lower car-
dinality with the appropriate properties (strategy-proofness and unanimity). This
makes the induction step relatively straightforward but entails the additional cost
of having to establish the Theorem in the non-trivial case of N = 2. In the current
setting, the cloning technique does not work because the peaks of all voters in the
function g may be diﬀerent. In order to deﬁne a SCF in a society of N − 1 voters
we use a projection technique. Most of the eﬀort in proving the result goes into
showing that there exists a SCF induced on a N1 society which satisﬁes the range
requirement. Some of the methods here are reminiscent of the arguments devel-
oped in Barber` a and Peleg (1990). In fact the object Rg(Pi) can be interpreted
as the option set oﬀered by voter i to the voters I − {i}. However, a pleasant
aspect of our approach is that the induction can begin at N = 1 which is a trivial
14case. We note that this approach can be used to give yet another proof of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
Remark 3.3 Note that for all a1,a2,···,aN ∈ A, it must be true that ai / ∈
φ2(a1,a2,···,aN) where φ1(a1,a2,···,aN) = i. In other words, if i is the dicta-
tor when the vector of peaks is (a1,a2,···,aN), then the set of alternatives over
which voter j is allowed to choose from cannot include j’s peak. If it did, then
Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) would be a singleton consisting of this peak which would violate
the assumption that this range has at least three alternatives.
Remark 3.4 We have noted (Remark 3.3) that the assumption that
Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) ≥ 3 can be restrictive. It is however not diﬃcult, though rather
clumsy to relax this assumption. If |Rf(a1,a2,···,aN)| = 1, then the associated
g function is constant. If |Rf(a1,a2,···,aN)| = 2, then the associated g function
is deﬁned by a committee. The latter comprises a set of winning coalitions which
satisfy a monotonicity property. Suppose Rf(a1,a2,···,aN) = {x,y}. For any
proﬁle P ∈ D(a1,a2,···,aN), we have g(P) = x if and only if the set of voters who
prefer x to y is a winning coalition.
Remark 3.5 We can provide some intuition for Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.4.
In order to characterize f which stisﬁes SP* we simply partition the domain I P N
into sets with the property that while the planner cannot distinguish between two
proﬁles in the same element of the partition, he can do so between proﬁles in dif-
ferent elements of the partition. The problem then ”essentially” reduces to ﬁnding
conventional strategy-proof SCFs over domains which constitute each element of
the partition (we are not being precise here - formal arguments are required which
15we have not provided). It is, however, still not a trivial problem to solve (one
might, for instance, be tempted to believe that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite The-
orem could be applied to each ”sub-domain”, i.e. the problem over a particular
element of the partition). This is because preferences are restricted in each of the
sub-domains. In particular, we are not free to choose peaks of voter preferences.
4 The Partially Informed Planner
In this section, we consider the case where the planner has some ex-ante information
about the peaks of individual preferences. Our objective is to contrast both the
formulation and the results here with those of the previous model.
For all i ∈ I, let Ai ⊂ A. The set Ai is the set of admissible peaks of voter i.
The planner thus has some ex-ante information about voter preferences.
Let Di = {Pi ∈ I P|r1(Pi) ∈ Ai}. We shall let D denote the Cartesian product of
the sets D1,D2,···DN. Elements of the set Di and D wil be referred to as an admis-
sible preference for voter i and an admissible preference proﬁle respectively. Finally,
let D−i denote the Cartesian product of the sets D1,···,Di−1,Di+1,···,DN.
Definition 4.1 A Social Choice Function (SCF) is a mapping f : D → A.
Definition 4.2 A SCF f is manipulable by voter i at (admissible) proﬁle P via
(admissible) ordering P 0
i if
f(P 0,P−i)Pif(P)
A SCF f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by an voter at any admissible
proﬁle.
The deﬁntions above are completely standard in the restricted domain litera-
ture. In contrast to the observant planner model, the domain of preferences here
are restricted but the incentive compatibility condition is stronger.
16As in the previous section, let Rf denote the range of the SCF f.
Theorem 4.1 Let f : D → A be a SCF with |Rf| ≥ 3. Then f is strategy-proof
if and only if it is dictatorial.
Proof: The suﬃciency part of the result is, of course, trivial. We prove only
the necessity part. The proof uses the same ideas as the proof of Theorem 3.1.
However, many of the details are far more subtle.
We will prove the result by induction on N, the number of voters. The result
is obvious in the case N = 1. In order to establish the induction step, we assume
that the result holds for all societies of size K where K is an integer strictly less
than some positive integer N.
Let f : D → A be a strategy-proof SCF with |Rf| ≥ 3. For all i ∈ I and
Pi ∈ Di, let
Rf(Pi) = {x|x = f(Pi,P−i) for some P−i ∈ D−i}
Lemma 4.1 Let Pi, ¯ Pi ∈ Di be such that max(Pi,Rf) = max( ¯ Pi,Rf). Then
Rf(Pi) = Rf( ¯ Pi).
Proof: Let max(Pi,Rf) = max( ¯ Pi,Rf) = x. We ﬁrst show that x ∈ Rf(Pi) and
x ∈ Rf( ¯ Pi).
Since x ∈ Rf, there exists ˜ P ∈ D such that f( ˜ P) = x. Let f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = w. If
x 6= w, then xPiw. But then voter i will manipulate at (Pi, ˜ P−i) via ˜ Pi. Therefore
f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = x so that x ∈ Rf(Pi). By an identical argument, x ∈ Rf( ¯ Pi).
Suppose that the Lemma is false. Then there must exist y distinct from x
such that y ∈ Rf(Pi) but y / ∈ Rf( ¯ Pi). Let ¯ P−i ∈ D−i be such that f(Pi, ¯ Pi) = y.
17Now construct P−i ∈ D−i by raising y and x ”as high as possible” in ¯ Pj for each
j 6= i. In other words, if y ∈ Aj, then r1(Pj) = y and r2(Pj) = x. If y / ∈ Aj, then
r1(Pj) = r1( ¯ Pj), r2(Pj) = y and r3(Pj) = x. Now progressively switch preferences
of all voters j 6= i from ¯ Pj to Pj. It follows from standard arguments that strategy-
proofness implies that each stage the outcome remains y, i.e f(Pi,P−i) = y.
Our goal is to show that f( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x. We do this in a sequence of steps.
Step 1 For all j 6= i, we construct P 0
j ∈ Dj by interchanging x and y in Pj.
If it is not possible to do this, i.e y ∈ Aj but x / ∈ Aj, we let Pj = P 0
j. We claim
that f(Pi,P 0
−i) ∈ {x,y}. To see this, change the preferences of some j 6= i from Pj
to P 0
j in the proﬁle (Pi,P 0
−i). Since f(Pi,P−i) = y and the only preference reversal
between Pj and P 0
j is that between x and y, it follows from standard strategy-
proofness arguments that the new outcome can only be either x or y. Moreover
the same argument holds as we progressively change preferences from P−i to P 0
−i
which establishes that f(Pi,P 0
−i) ∈ {x,y}.
Step 2 We claim that in fact, f(Pi,P 0
−i) = x. Since x ∈ Rf(Pi), there exists
˜ P−i ∈ D−i such that f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = x. Let r1( ˜ Pj) = bj for all j 6= i. Similarly,
let r1(P 0
j) = aj for all j 6= i. By a standard strategy-proofness argument, we can
assume without loss of generality that for all j 6= i, if bj is distinct from aj, x and
y, then r4(P 0
j) = bj. 4 Similarly we can assume without loss of generality that if
aj, bj, x and y are all distinct, then r3( ˜ Pj) = y and r4( ˜ Pj) = aj. Moreover, we
can also assume without loss of generality that the ranking of all alternatives other
than these four agree in ˜ Pj and P 0
j for all j 6= i. Now, suppose that contrary to
our claim, f(Pi,P 0
−i) = y. Start with the proﬁle (Pi,P 0
−i) and progressively (in
some sequence) switch preferences of all voters j 6= i to ˜ Pj. Note that at some
stage the outcome must change because f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = x by assumption. Let k
4If bj is indeed distinct from the other three alternatives, then bj is worse than these alter-
natives in P0
j and can be shuﬄed around as long as it remains below these three alternatives,
without aﬀecting the outcome f(Pi,P0
−i) which we have established is either x or y.
18be the ﬁrst voter in the sequence such that outcome diﬀers from y. Note that by
strategy-proofness, this outcome can only be bk. Moreover, if the outcome switches
to z further along the sequence when, say, voter t switches preferences from P 0
t to
˜ Pt. By strategy-proofness this is possible only if at = bk and z = bt. We can
conclude therefore that f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = bk for some voter k 6= i. But this contradicts
the assumption that f(Pi, ˜ P−i) = x. Therefore f(Pi,P 0
−i) = x.
Step 3 We claim that f( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i) = x. Suppose instead that f( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i) = z
where z is distinct from x. Since x = max( ¯ Pi,Rf) by assumption, x ¯ Piz. Therefore
i will manipulate at ( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i) via Pi. This completes the step.
Step 4 We claim that f( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x. Recall that for all j 6= i, P 0
j is obtained
from Pj by interchanging x and y (which are contiguous in Pj). Now start with
the proﬁle ( ¯ Pi,P 0
−i) and switch preferences of all j 6= i progressively from P 0
j to Pj.
It follows from strategy-proofness that the outcome at each point in the sequence
is either x or y. But it cannot be y because y / ∈ Rf( ¯ Pi) by hypothesis. Therefore
f( ¯ Pi,P−i) = x.
We now complete the proof of the Lemma. Since f(Pi,P−i) = y and f( ¯ Pi,P−i) =
x where xPi,y, voter i can manipulate.
Lemma 4.2 |Rf(Pi)| = 1 or |Rf(Pi)| ≥ 3.
Proof: Suppose not. Suppose there exists x,y,z ∈ Rf with x,y ∈ Rf(Pi) and
z / ∈ Rf(Pi).
We have shown in the proof of the earlier lemma that if an alterntive is maximal
in Rf according to Pi, then it belongs to Rf(Pi). We can therefore assume without
loss of generality that x = max(Pi,Rf(Pi)). Furthermore, applying Lemma 4.1 we
can assume that x and z are contiguous i.e. there exists an integer k such that
rk(Pi) = x and rk+1(Pi) = z. Since y ∈ Rf(Pi), there exists P−i ∈ D−i such that
19f(Pi,P−i) = y. Moreover, using arguments that we have used repeatedly earlier,
we can assume that for all voters j 6= i
• if y ∈ Aj, then y = r1(Pi) and z = r2(Pi)
• if y / ∈ Aj, then y = r2(Pi) and z = r3(Pi).
For all j 6= i, let P 0
j be obtained by switching (if possible) y and z in Pj.
Progressively switch preferences of all voters j 6= i in the proﬁle (Pi,P−i) from Pj
to P 0
j. It follows from strategy-proofness that at each stage of this procedure, the




i be the preference ordering obtained by switching x and z in Pi. Since
both z and x are strictly better than y according to Pi, strategy-proofness implies
that f(P 0,P−i) = y. The proof of the Lemma is completed by showing that
f(P 0,P 0
−i) must, in fact, be z.
In order to establish this, note that z = max (P 0,Rf), so that z ∈ Rf(P 0
i).
We can now mimic the arguments in Step 2 of the previous lemma and we sketch
them brieﬂy. Since z ∈ Rf(P 0
i), there exists ¯ P−i ∈ D−i such that f(P 0
i, ¯ P−i) =
z. Moreover we can assume that z and y are contiguous (with z better than y
whenever possible) in ¯ Pj, j 6= i and both these alternatives are ranked as high
as possible. Now progressivly switch preferences from ¯ P−i to P 0
−i. The critical
diﬀerence between the ¯ Pj and P 0
j is that their peaks could diﬀer. By making
suitable (innocuous) assumptions regarding the ranking of alternatives other than
y and z, it is possible to conclude that if f(P 0
i,P 0
−i) 6= z, then it must be the
case that f(P 0
i,P 0
−i) = ak where ak = r1(P 0
k) for some voter k 6= i. But this will
contradict our earlier conclusion that the outcome at this proﬁle is y.
Lemma 4.3 It cannot be the case that for all i ∈ I and Pi ∈ Di, we have
|Rf(Pi)| = 1.
20The proof of this Lemma is identical to that of Lemma 3.4 and is omitted. The
idea of the proof is as follows. If Rf(Pi) is a singleton say x, then the outcome of
every f, at every proﬁle where voter i’s preference is Pi must be x. In particular,
the outcome where all voters j 6= i rank x last, must also be x. Now ﬁx the
preferences of some j 6= i and repeat the argument to conclude that x is the
outcome even when it is ranked last by all voters. But strategy-proofness would
then immediately imply that that the outcome at all proﬁles is x contradicting the
assumption that the range of f has at least three elements.
It follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that there exists a voter i and an ordering
Pi ∈ Di such that |Rf(Pi)| ≥ 3. Deﬁne the function h : D−i → A as follows.
h(P−i) = f(Pi,P−i) for all P−i ∈ D−i
It is trivial to check that h is strategy-proof. Moreover we have shown that |Rh| ≥
3. Therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis and infer that there exists
j 6= i such that for all P−i ∈ D−i,
f(Pi,P−i) = max (Pj,Rf(Pi))
In other words, if voter i’s preference is Pi, then voter j dictates over Rf(Pi). In
order to complete the proof of the Theorem, it is required only to show that voter
j continues to dictate even when i changes his preference. We can use the same
arguments that we used to show the same thing in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We
brieﬂy sketch the details.
Consider a switch of two contiguous elements, say x and y in Pi does not change
the outcome for any P−i ∈ D−i. Suppose that xPiy and let the new preferences of i
be denoted by ¯ Pi. Suppose that |Rf( ¯ Pi)| ≥ 3. Applying the induction hypothesis,
it follows tht there exists a voter k who dictates over Rf( ¯ Pi). If the outcome is to
change when i changes his preferences, it must be true that j and k are distinct.
But if they are then it is easy to derive a contradiction. Consider a proﬁle for all
21players other than i where voter j’and k’ s maximal elements in Rf(Pi) and Rf( ¯ Pi)
are y and x respectively. Then i would manipulate aat this proﬁle when his true
preferences are Pi by announcing ¯ Pi. So suppose |Rf( ¯ Pi)| = 1 and suppose that
for some proﬁle of preferences of the other voters, the outcome changes from x to
y (this is the only change consistent with strategy-proofness). There must exist
some z in Rf(Pi) distinct from x and y. Pick a proﬁle for voters other than i where
z is maximal in Rf for voter j. There are two cases to consider. One is where
x and y are bothbetter than z under Pi and the other is when x and y are both
worse than z under Pi. (Recall that x and y are contiguous in Pi.) Since Rg( ¯ Pi)
is a singleton, the outcome at the proﬁle where i’s preferences are ¯ Pi must be y.
Suppose that yPiz. Then i will manipulate when his preferences are Pi via ¯ Pi.
The proof is now completed by observing that every ordering for voter i can be
obtained by a sequence of switches elements starting from Pi.
Remark 4.1 Like the proof of Theorem 3.1, it does not seem possible to provide
a proof of Theorem 4.1 by the cloning method. Once again the diﬃculty is that
the domain resrictions are voter-speciﬁc.
The dictatorship result does not hold if the planner has information about more
than just top-ranked alternatives. We illustrate this with an example.
Example 4.1
Let I = {1,2} and A = {a,b,c,d}.
Suppose that the planner has the following information regarding the prefer-
ences of voter 1. He knows that if 1 ranks a ﬁrst, then he ranks b second. There are
no other restrictions regarding the ranking of alternatives. In other words, among
the 12 possible pairs of ﬁrst and second alternatives, exactly two, viz. a is ﬁrst and
22c second and a is ﬁrst and d second are infeasible. There are no other restrictions
on the preferences of other voters.
We claim that there is exists a non-dictatorial SCF in this setting. The outcome
at any proﬁle is voter 1’s top ranked alternative if this alternative is b, c or d. If it
is a then the outcome is the alternative in the pair {a,b} which is higher ranked
in voter 2’s preferences.
It is easy to check that this SCF is strategy-proof. Voter 1 is not getting his
peak only in the case where his peak is a. In this case he might get his second
ranked alternative b. However, since 2 prefers b to a, there is no way for 1 to do
better and get a.
This example appeared originally in Aswal, Chatterji and Sen (2001) where it
was employed for a diﬀerent purpose. We note that there are other ways to extend
the spirit of the domain restrictions from the tops case analysed in this section to
the more case. For instance, we may require that an alternative is never ranked in
the kth position and so on.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of mechanism design in two diﬀerent models.
The ﬁrst is one where the planner is able to observe the actual realization of voter
peaks. The second is one where the planner only has ex-ante information about
possible peaks. The paper deﬁnes and characterizes ncentive compatible social
choice functions in both settings. The class of such mechanisms is much larger in
the observant planner case where the mechanism designer’s information is ex-post.
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